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COMMERCIAL CARRIERS AND OLD
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this
matter,

pursuant

to

Article

VIII,

Section

5

of

the

Utah

Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1990), 35-182.53(2) (1988), 35-1-86 (1988), and63-46b-14 (1988).

I

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

||

Did the Industrial Commission correctly award Ronny Judd
benefits after he was severely beaten by two young men who were
trying to vandalize the cargo on Mr. Judd's truck?
Did the Industrial Commission abuse its discretion in
granting a 30-day extension to Mr. Judd for filing his Motion for

1

Review when defendants were not substantially prejudiced by the
extension and the Industrial Commission did not act contrary to
prior practice?

I CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES \\
The statutes and rules that are dispositive of this
appeal are as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-3 3
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)
Utah R. Civ. P. 6(b)
Utah R. Civ. P. 61
These are attached as Addendum A, pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
24(f).

[ STATEMENT OF THE CASE

||

Mr. Judd was transporting vehicles from Missouri to
California when he stopped for an overnight rest in Kearney,
Nebraska.
Judd

and

(R. 101-2).

Sometime after his arrival in Kearney, Mr.

another driver, Mr. Coyle, observed

two young men

attempting to vandalize the new cars they were transporting.
109, 149-50, 295, 469).

(R.

Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle attempted to

protect the cargo, and the young men severely beat Mr. Judd.
217, 295).

2

(R.

Mr. Judd applied for benefits and his employer denied the
claim. Mr. Judd then filed an Application for Hearing.

(R. 5-6) .

After a hearing was held, the ALJ denied benefits because, in his
opinion, Mr. Judd was fighting over the affections of two women and
not protecting the vehicles he was transporting.

(R. 19-28).

Before the 30-day limit ran on filing a Motion for Review, Mr. Judd
filed a letter with the Industrial Commission requesting a 3 0-day
extension.

(R. 29) . The Industrial Commission granted the 30-day

extension.

(R. 30).

Defendants objected to the extension;

however, in defendants' objection they failed to show how they were
prejudiced by the extension.

(R. 31-33).

The Industrial Commission granted the Motion for Review.
(R. 34-38).

In its Order the Industrial Commission found that Mr.

Judd's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
(R. 34-38).

Defendants appeal the Industrial Commission's Order.

(R. 56-57).

[STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr.

Judd

has been

employed

j
as

a

truck

driver by

Commercial Carriers since 1980, working out of the company's
Clearfield, Utah, terminal.

(R. 96, 97). During mid-May, 1992,

Mr. Judd and another driver, Mr. Coyle, were assigned to drive two
trucks loaded with new automobiles from Missouri to California.
(R. 101) . The drivers were responsible for the safekeeping of the
vehicles they were transporting.

(R. 113, 160).
3

Judd and Coyle left Missouri the morning of May 21.
Because they were limited by company policy and/or government
regulations to driving no more than 10 hours or 540 miles at a
stretch, they stopped at Ft. Kearney, Nebraska for the night.
102).

(R.

At approximately 6:30 p.m., Messrs. Judd and Coyle located

an appropriate motel in Ft. Kearney, parked their trucks adjacent
to each other in the parking lot, checked into their respective
rooms, then went to the motel's lounge.
In
beverages.

the

lounge, Judd

and

(R. 105, 106, 291, 292).

Coyle

consumed

alcoholic

Two women already in the bar, one of whom was a slight

acquaintance of Judd, joined them at their table. To some degree,
the women joined Judd and Coyle to avoid the attentions of two
other younger men, who had been asking the women to dance.

(R.

107, 147, 453). When the lounge closed, Judd and Coyle walked the
two women to their car and said goodbye.
away.

The women then drove

(R. 147-8, 294-5, 456).
At approximately the same time, the two young men who had

also been in the lounge, struck up a conversation with Judd and
Coyle.

The young men suggested that they buy more beer and drink

it in their motel room. Judd and Coyle declined the offer, stating
that it was too late and that they had to leave early the next
morning.

(R. 108, 148, 295, 468).

During the course of this

conversation, the young men expressed interest in the new cars
Coyle and Judd were transporting.

The young men suggested they

would like to take one of the cars for a drive.

4

Judd told the

young men that such use of the cars was not permitted, and that the
cars all had alarms in them.

(R. 148, 295, 457-8).

At this point, Judd and Coyle left the young men and
walked into the parking lot to check their trucks.

(R. 295) . They

then walked across the parking lot to a convenience store to buy
some personal items, but the store was closed.

(R. 109, 149, 468).

As they walked back to the motel, Judd and Coyle observed the two
young men walk into a field adjacent to the parking lot, then
return to the parking lot and walk around the cars and trucks that
were parked there.

Judd and Coyle went to their trucks and

observed the young men from the shadows.

(R. 109, 149-50, 295,

469) .
The young men approached Judd and Coyle7s trucks and were
heard to say, "These must be the vehicles with the alarms." Judd
and Coyle then stepped out from the shadows and told them to stay
away from their trucks and all other trucks in the parking lot.
(R. 295) .

The two young men ran away into the adjacent field.

Judd and Coyle walked into the field after them. Approximately 30
yards into the field, the young men stopped.

One of them began

beating Judd, resulting in very serious injuries that give rise to
Judd's claim for compensation.

(R. 217, 295).

The fight occurred at approximately 1:57 a.m.

(R. 294).

Hospital blood tests established that Judd had a blood alcohol
level of .18% at the time the test was taken, after the beating.
(R. 217) . Judge Allen noted that two hours after Mr. Judd took his
last drink his alcohol was tested.
5

(R. 24).

Mr. Judd filed an application for hearing on November 3,
1992.

(R. 5-6). At the hearing, Mr. Judd testified that he had

never been instructed what to do when someone is attempting to
vandalize his truck or cargo.

(R. 113). Defendants called Michael

E. Tracy, a terminal manager at Commercial Carriers.

(R. 163).

Mr. Tracy testified that after a vehicle is vandalized, the drivers
are instructed to call the police and the company.
However,

Mr.

Tracy

testified

that

drivers

have

(R. 165) .
never

been

instructed what to do if they catch somebody "messing with their
cars or cargo."

(R. 165).

After the hearing, on May 5, 1993, Judge Allen entered
his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order denying Mr.
Judd his benefits.

(R. 19-28).

On June 3, 1993, Mr. Judd moved

the Industrial Commission for a 30-day continuance to file his
Motion for Review.

(R. 29). On June 7, 1993, Judge Allen granted

Mr. Judd's request for an extension of time.

(R. 30). On June 8,

1993, defendants filed an objection to the Motion for Continuance.
(R. 31-3 3).

However, defendants did not show any substantial

prejudice in their objection.

(R. 31-33).

Judd filed his Motion for Review.

On July 6, 1993, Mr.

(R. 34-38).

The Industrial

Commission unanimously reversed the ALJ's decision and awarded Mr.
Judd his benefits.

(R. 50-54).

6

II

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

||

Defendants have failed to marshall all the evidence as is
required when contesting the Findings of Fact of an administrative
hearing.
cite

Defendants merely reargue their case. Defendants do not

one

paragraph

of

the

Industrial

paragraphs in the Findings of Fact.
substantial

facts and

Commission's

thirteen

Additionally, there are

evidence in the record

supporting the

Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact. Consequently, this court
must adopt the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact.
The Industrial Commission correctly applied the law to
the facts of this case.

Mr. Judd was attempting to protect the

vehicles he was taking cross-country when he was severely beaten.
Mr. Judd's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
Defendants

have

failed

to

show

that

they

were

substantially prejudiced when the Industrial Commission granted Mr.
Judd a 30-day extension to file his Motion for Review.

Also,

defendants have failed to show that the Industrial Commission acted
inconsistently pursuant to their claim under Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4) (h) (iii) . Defendants are attempting to deny Mr. Judd his
benefits because the Industrial Commission did not require him to
show good cause for an extension.
amounts to harmless error.

This is a technicality, which

Therefore, this court must deny

defendants' appeal and affirm the Industrial Commission's Order.

7

II

ARGUMENT

||

POINT I
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE.

A.

When
administrative

STANDARD OF REVIEW

challenging
proceeding,

the

Findings

defendants

must

of

Fact

show

the

in

an

factual

findings are "not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court.11

Intermountain Health

Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendants also have the duty to "marshall all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts,
and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence."
omitted and emphasis in the original) .

Id. (cites

In Merriam v. Board of

Review, 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991), this court stated
"Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person 'might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"

Id. (citations

omitted).
Defendants claim that there are only two facts they
dispute.

However, in footnote 4 on page 11 of defendants' brief,

they state that the "Board's inference is factual in nature and
constitutes a finding of fact."

The Industrial Commission's

thirteen paragraphs of Findings of Fact show the fight occurred

8

when Mr. Judd tried to protect his truck's cargo.

Consequently,

defendants must marshall all of the evidence that supports and
contradicts the Industrial Commission's findings that Mr. Judd's
beating was related to his attempt to protect the trucks. Instead,
defendants cite only to Judge Allen's order and no independent
testimony or evidence in the record.

Simply stated, defendants

merely argue the facts that support Judge Allen's hypothesis that
the fight occurred over the affections of two women.

Because

defendants did not marshall the relevant evidence presented at the
hearing which supports the Industrial Commission's decision, this
court must accept the Industrial Commission's factual conclusions.
Johnson v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. , 842 P.2d 910, 912
(Utah App. 1992).

B.

DEFENDANTS' ARGUE THE FACTS
INSTEAD OF MARSHALLING THEM

The Industrial Commission's Order Granting Motion for
Review has thirteen paragraphs of Findings of Fact.

Amazingly,

defendants do not cite one paragraph in their brief!

Defendants

are under the mistaken belief that the Industrial Commission has to
cite to some evidence in the record to support its findings.
Defendants, not the Industrial Commission, have a duty to marshall
all of the evidence so this court can "examine both sides of the
record, and not simply that part of the record which supports the
ALJ's findings."

Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137

(Utah App. 1992).
9

Therefore, Mr. Judd will verify each paragraph of the
Industrial

Commission's

references to the record.

Findings

of

Fact

with

independent

Mr. Judd will properly marshall the

evidence and show there is substantial evidence in the record
supporting the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact.
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact are as
follows:
1.

Mr. Judd has been employed as a truck driver by
Commercial Carriers since 1980, working out of the
company's Clearfield, Utah, terminal. (R. 96, 97).

2.

During mid-May, 1992, Mr. Judd and another driver,
Mr. Coyle, were assigned to drive two trucks loaded
with new automobiles from Missouri to California.
(R. 101).

3.

Judd and Coyle left Missouri the morning of May 21.
Because they were limited by company policy and/or
government regulations to driving no more than 10
hours or 540 miles at a stretch, they stopped at
Ft. Kearney, Nebraska for the night. (R. 102).

4.

At approximately 6:30 p.m., Messrs. Judd and Coyle
located an appropriate motel in Ft. Kearney, parked
their trucks adjacent to each other in the parking
lot, checked into their respective rooms, then went
to the motel's lounge. (R. 105, 106, 291, 292).

5.

In the lounge, Judd and Coyle consumed alcoholic
beverages. Two women already in the bar, one of
whom was a slight acquaintance of Judd, joined them
at their table. To some degree, the women joined
Judd and Coyle to avoid the attentions of two other
younger men, who had been asking the women to
dance. (R. 107, 147, 453).

6.

When the lounge closed, Judd and Coyle walked the
two women to their car and said goodbye. The women
then drove away. (R. 147-8, 294-5, 456).

7.

At approximately the same time, the two young men
who had also been in the lounge, struck up a
conversation with Judd and Coyle. The young men
suggested that they buy more beer and drink it in
10

their motel room,
Judd and Coyle declined the
offer, stating that it was too late and that they
had to leave early the next morning.
(R. 108, 148, 295, 468)•
8.

During the course of this conversation, the young
men expressed interest in the new cars Coyle and
Judd were transporting. The young men suggested
they would like to take one of the cars for a
drive. Judd told the young men that such use of
the cars was not permitted, and that the cars all
had alarms in them. (R. 148, 295, 457-8).

9.

At this point, Judd and Coyle left the young men
and walked into the parking lot to check their
trucks.
(R. 295). They then walked across the
parking lot to a convenience store to buy some
personal items, but the store was closed. (R. 109,
149, 468).

10.

As they walked back to the motel, Judd and Coyle
observed the two young men walk into a field
adjacent to the parking lot, then return to the
parking lot and walk around the cars and trucks
that were parked there. Judd and Coyle went to
their trucks and observed the young men from the
shadows. (R. 109, 149-50, 295, 469).

11.

The young men approached Judd and Coyle7s trucks
and were heard to say, "These must abe [sic] the
vehicles with the alarms". [sic] Judd and Coyle
then stepped out from the shadows and told them to
stay away from their trucks and all other trucks in
the parking lot. (R. 295).

12.

The two young men ran away into the field. Judd
and Coyle walked into the field after them.
Approximately 30 yards into the field, the young
men stopped.
One of them began beating Judd,
resulting in very serious injuries that give rise
to Judd's claim for compensation. (R. 217, 295).

13.

Hospital blood tests established that Judd had a
blood alcohol level of .18% at the time the test
was taken, after the beating. (R. 217).

The Industrial Commission relied upon police reports,
medical records, and deposition and hearing testimony in making

11

their statement of facts.

The Industrial Commission's order

presents enough facts so that this court does not have to "search
the record to determine whether findings could have been made by
the Commission to support its order . . . "

Mountain States Legal

Found, v. Public Serv. Comm'n.. 636 P. 2d 1047, 1052 (Utah App.
1981).

There is substantial evidence to support these Findings of

Fact.
Defendants mischaracterize Adams v. Board of Review of
Indus. Comm'n. , 821 P. 2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), saying that the
Industrial Commission, in the present case, did not present enough
facts to support their Conclusions of Law.

In Adams, this court

stated:
The Commission's "findings" amount to the
following single conclusory statement as to
causation:
"The preponderance of medical
evidence in this case establishes that the
applicant's various listed symptoms are not
related to her work as a telemarketer at
Unicorp." (Emphasis added).
Adams, 821 P.2d at 5.

A single conclusory statement is not the

same as thirteen paragraphs of Findings of Fact.

The Industrial

Commission has adequate facts for defendants to marshall the
evidence.
Defendants want this court to adopt the ALJ's findings
that the fight arose over the affections of two women.

In trying

to support Judge Allen's fanciful theory, defendants again fail to
marshall all of the evidence. There is substantial evidence in the
record contrary to Judge Allen's theory.

Mr. Judd testified that

there were no fights or disturbances or any mishap in the bar
12

whatsoever.

(R. 107) .

The conversation that Mr. Judd and Mr.

Coyle had with the young men in the bar was "just friendly, casual
talking."

(R. 147).

Mr. Judd also testified in his deposition

that the two young men approached him in the bar in an effort to be
"chatty and friendly."

(R. 456). The two young men also asked if

Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle would like to share some beer with them.
(R. 148, 295) . The only evidence cited by the defendants, that the
fight arose over the women, is Judge Allen's order.

They do not

cite any independent evidence to support their theory. Defendants7
attempt to marshall the evidence is so poorly done that it appears
that they have:
[M]erely presented carefully selected facts
and excerpts of trial testimony in support of
its position. Such selective citation to the
record does not begin to marshall the evidence; it is nothing more than an attempt to
reargue the case before this court—a tactic
that we reject.
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d
1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994).

C.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
IS THE ULTIMATE FACT FINDER

Moreover, defendants do not seem to understand that the
Industrial Commission is the ultimate fact finder, not the ALJ.
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah App. 1990).
In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 607 P.2d 807 (Utah
1980), the Industrial Commission reversed the ALJ's denial of
benefits to an injured employee.

13

On appeal, the employer claimed

that the Commission could not overturn the ALJ's decision because
the Commission "did not hear or see the witnesses and took no new
evidence,"

.Id, at 810, The Commission's decision overturned the

ALJ's ruling that the applicant and his wife's statements were
"self-serving,"

Id. at 812. The Supreme Court concluded:

We hold, therefore, that the Commission,
sitting en banc, if it deems that further
evidence is not necessary, need not hold
further hearings, and its review of the record
made before the Administrative Law Judge, may
make its own findings on the credibility of
the evidence presented.
The Commission's
findings so made will not be disturbed by this
court if they are supported by substantial
evidence. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 811. In the case at hand, defendants would like this court
to ignore the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact, which were
supported by substantial evidence, and reinstate the ALJ's order
simply because the ALJ observed the witnesses' demeanor and
credibility.

Defendants' brief p. 14. Such a decision would run

contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in U.S. Steel.
For whatever reason, defendants do not cite to U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980). Instead,
they cite to other jurisdictions in an attempt to persuade this
court that the Industrial Commission did not list enough facts for
this court to check for substantial evidence.

Because defendants

failed to even list the Findings of Fact of the Industrial
Commission, their argument is completely meritless.
the cases they cite are inapposite.
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Furthermore,

What is most troubling to Mr. Judd is how defendants
continually mischaracterize the evidence in their brief.

In

footnote 5 on page 17 of their brief, they state "Mr. Judd still
deviated

from his course of employment by violating company

regulations instructing employees to call the police and not to
pursue vandals."

At the hearing defendants' terminal manager,

Michael E. Tracy, testified that after a vehicle is vandalized the
drivers are instructed to call the police and the company.

(R.

165) . He then stated:
Q.

What are the drivers instructed to
do if they find someone messing with
their cars or cargo?

A.

I don't believe that we have ever
instructed them of what to do.
(Emphasis added.)

(R. 165). That testimony corroborates Mr. Judd's testimony that he
had never been instructed what to do when someone is trying to
vandalize his truck or its cargo.

(R. 113). There is no evidence

that it violates company policy to pursue someone attempting to
vandalize a truck or its cargo, as defendants would like this court
to believe.
Also, defendants claim that "There is no evidentiary
basis in the record for the Board's finding that Mr. Judd checked
his truck."

Defendants' brief, pp. 8, 17.

Contrary to this

erroneous assertion, the police report states:
He [Coyle] advised at this time these subjects
walked up and started asking questions about
the cars that were loaded on their trucks.
Coyle advised they talked to the two subjects
for a short time. Coyle advised that he told
15

Judd he was going to go out and check the
vehicles and their trucks at which time he and
Judd both went out to their trucks to check
them.
(Emphasis added.)
(R. 295). Defendants either missed this evidence or ignored it.
In

an

apparent

attempt

to

prejudice

this

court,

defendants raise the irrelevant issue of Mr. Judd's drinking.
Appellant's state, "During this time Mr. Judd had consumed so much
alcohol that his blood alcohol level was high enough to have
dropped to .18% by the next morning."
Defendants' brief p. 13.

(Emphasis in original).

The fight occurred at about 1:57 a.m.

(.R. 294) . Judge Allen noted that two hours after Mr. Judd's last
drink his alcohol level was tested.

(R. 24). Technically, that

may be "the next morning/" however, it appears to be a brazen
attempt to mischaracterize the evidence.
Mr. Judd has shown that the Industrial Commission's order
is supported by substantial evidence.

Defendants have failed

miserably to marshall all of the evidence in their brief, and they
have mischaracterized some of the evidence, which is a far cry from
marshalling it.

The only evidence defendants cite in support of

their theory is Judge Allen's order!

There is absolutely no

objective evidence that this fight was caused by a dispute over the
affections of two women.

Therefore, this court must adopt: the

Industrial Commissions Findings of Fact.
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POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY APPLIED
THE LAW TO THE FACTS

A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

After this court accepts the Findings of Fact of the
Industrial

Commission,

Commissions

application

it

then

of

"correction-of-error standard."

law

must
to

review
those

the
facts

Industrial
using

the

King v. Industrial Commission of

Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993).

B.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY AWARDED
BENEFITS TO MR. JUDD BECAUSE HIS INJURY AROSE
OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN
HE WAS SEVERELY BEATEN TRYING TO PROTECT
HIS TRUCK'S CARGO.

The Industrial Commission correctly cited to Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-45, which states that "Compensation will be paid to an
employee, 'who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment.'"

Id. In M & K Corp. v. Industrial

Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948), the Utah Supreme
Court, quoting 71 CJ 644, § 396, stated, "the words 'arising out
of' are construed to refer to the origin or cause of the injury,
and the words 'in the course of' refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which it occurred. . . . "
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Id. at 134.

1.

Mr. Judd's Iniurv Arose Out of His Employment

The Industrial Commission correctly stated in its
order, "arising out of employment" requires a causal connection to
an injury and the employment.

It then correctly found a causal

connection between Mr. Judd's beating and his employment.
Commission

relied upon the well respected

The

treatise, Larson's

Workmen's Compensation, in making its decision. In Volume 1, § 11,
Professor Larson discusses assaults.

Volume 1, § 11.11(c) is

entitled "Assaults as street risk," and it states that the "streetrisk doctrine as applied to assaults is another common application
of the general rule granting compensation when the assault arises
out of a risk associated with the situs of the work."
Workmen's

Compensation, Vol. 1, § 11.11(c).

The

Larson's
Industrial

Commission cited Professor Larson's conclusion to this section,
which states, "The controlling test should be 'if the circumstances
of the employment can be fairly said to have elicited conduct by
the employee which results in his injury.'"

Id.

In the case at hand, the Industrial Commission concluded
that Mr. Judd was at a motel pre-approved by the employer, that Mr.
Judd was required to keep the cargo safe, and that Mr. Judd checked
to see what some young men were doing around his truck.

When the

young men ran into the adjacent field, Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle
walked into the field to insure that the young men had left. When
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle saw that the young men had not left, Mr.
Judd and Mr. Coyle approached them, whereupon the young men
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severely beat Mr. Judd.

The Commission then concluded that Mr.

Judd's employment placed him in the situation where he was beaten.
Furthermore, Professor Larson discusses fights involving
employees in § 11.15(a) of his treatise, which the Commission cited
as follows:
If the fight is spontaneous and closely entangled
with the work itself—as most are—the assertion
that the claimant left his employment is an
outright fiction; and fictions should not be
invented to block benefits conferred by a remedial
statute.
Larson's Workman's Compensation, Vol. 1, § 11.15(a).
Presently, defendants have attempted to create several
fictions in an attempt to deny Mr. Judd his statutory benefits.
First, they claim the fight arose over the affections of two women.
"Fiction" or "fable" accurately describe such an absurd inference.
Second, defendants try to create a fiction that, because the fight
occurred thirty yards from the trucks that Mr. Judd's employment
terminated.

Lastly, defendants create another fiction by claiming

that, because the fight occurred after Mr. Judd's working hours, it
was not in the course of his employment.
The fight arose because some young men were attempting to
vandalize the cars and Mr. Judd tried to stop them.

It was Mr.

Judd's job to safely transport the cars. The fight was spontaneous
and closely entangled with his job. Therefore, the fight arose out
of his employment.
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2.

Mr. Judd Was Injured in the
Course of His Employment

Again, the Industrial Commission correctly cites to
Larson's Workman's Compensationf Vol. 1, § 14.00, which states:
The course of employment . . . demands that
the injury be shown to have arisen within the
time and space boundaries of the employment,
and in the course of an activity whose purpose
is related to the employment.
Id.

In M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d

132 (Utah 1948), the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he requirement that the accident arise in
the course of the employment is satisfied if
it occurs while the employee is rendering
service to his employer which he was hired to
do or doing something incidental thereto, at
the time when and the place where he was
authorized to render such service.
M & K Corp., 189 P.2d at 134. This court, in Walls v. Industrial
Comm'n. of Utah, 857 P.2d 964 (Utah App. 1993), discusses what is
necessary for an employee to be "in the course of" his or her
employment. Jd. at 967. This court denied Walls' benefits because
she had stopped working and was merely socializing at the bar when
she offered to help move a keg of beer.

Walls, 857 P.2d at 966.

The dissent felt she was entitled to benefits and cited Maintenance
Meruit.. Inc. v. Tinkel, 40 Colo. App. 80, 570 P.2d 840 (1977).

In

response to the dissent's position, the majority, in footnote 4,
distinguished the Colorado case as follows:
That case [Maintenance Momt.. Inc.] stands for
the proposition that when an employer only
fixes an employee's general work time, and the
employer benefits from a departure from the
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schedule, injuries sustained in that departure
are within the course of employment. Id. 570
P.2d at 842-43. In the present case, Walls's
employer fixed a particular work schedule, not
just general working hours, and the deviation
was not one from the schedule, but one that
took place several hours after her scheduled
employment had ended.
Walls, 857 P.2d at 970.
Mr. Judd had a general work time. He could drive for 10
hours or 54 0 miles in a day. Mr. Judd then departed from that work
schedule by checking his cargo to insure its safety. Mr. Judd was
"rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do . . .
at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render
such service."

M & K Corp., 189 P.2d at 134.

Defendants do not dispute Mr. Judd had a responsibility
to bring those vehicles safely to their destination.

Because Mr.

Judd was insuring the safety of those vehicles and was injured in
performing that duty, he was acting within the course of his
employment.
In a footnote, defendants make a weak argument that Mr.
Judd deviated from his employment because he allegedly violated
company regulations in pursuing the vandals. As shown above, there
are

no

company

regulations

telling

drivers

not

to "pursue"

potential vandals. In support of this contention, defendants cite
M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132
(1948).

Had defendants carefully read M & K Corp., they would not

be making this erroneous assertion.
Corp., stated:
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The Supreme Court in M & K

Not every violation bv an employee of a
statutory provision of a rule or regulation of
his employer constitutes a departure from the
course of his employment. The general rule is
that where the employee, at the time of the
accident, is engaged in doing a thing or
rendering a service which he is employed or
authorized to do, either expressly or by the
nature of and the surrounding facts and
circumstances of his employment, or is doing
something which is incidental thereto, but
does such act or renders such service or
incidental in an unlawful or forbidden manner,
he does not thereby depart from the course of
his employment even though the accident occurs
as a consequence of such violation.
It is
only when the act or service which the
employee is performing is itself prohibited,
as distinguished from the manner in which the
act is done or the service is performed, that
the violation of a statutory provision or of a
rule or regulation of the employer takes the
employee outside of the course of his
employment and defeats a recovery. (Emphasis
added).
M & K Corp. , 189 P. 2d at 138.

The court further stated that

whether the violation of a statute or employer's regulation takes
an employee out of the course of his employment is an area "for
great diversions of opinion. No comprehensive, all-inclusive rule
has been or can be stated which will determine all cases, each case
has to be determined on its own facts."

Id. at 139.

Mr. Judd was not forbidden by law or company policy to
check his vehicles to insure their safety.

If Mr. Judd had been

forbidden to check the vehicles, then it would not matter how he
was checking them and he would be barred from compensation.

Mr.

Judd was responsible for those vehicles, and when he checked them
he found two young men trying to break into them. He yelled at the
young men, walked into the adjacent field after them to insure that
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they had left, and then was severely beaten by the young men.
Therefore, he did not leave the course of his employment.
Defendants cite to Dale v. Trade Street, Inc. 854 P. 2d
828 (Mont. 1993) in support of their argument that Mr. Judd has
deviated from his employment.

Dale is easily distinguishable.

Dale was a truck driver delivering a load of lumber from Montana to
Michigan. His sister lived in Mile City, Montana and he stopped to
see her on his way to Michigan.

Dale parked his truck at a Flying

J truck stop near Mile City and his brother came and picked him up
to drive him into Mile City.

On the way into Mile City they were

in a single car accident and both were injured.

The Montana

Supreme Court's focus was whether or not Dale's visit was "a
substantial deviation from Dale's employment."

Id. at 832.

Mr. Jucid's beating is significantly different.

Because

he was protecting his cargo, that can hardly be construed as a
deviation from his employment. Defendants have not cited one case
in support of thsir theory with facts similar to this.
Larson reports on a California case with facts strikingly
similar to the case at hand, Martinez v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.,
15 Cal. 3d 982, 544 P.2d 1350 (1976). Larson states the case as
follows:
The claimant, a member of the parish council,
was engaged to help operate the beer booth at
a church fiesta. In the evening, after his
duties were finished, he heard that some
youths were stealing beer from the booth.
Finding some youths on the church premises
with beer, the claimant assumed it was stolen
and attempted to retrieve it. A fight ensued
in which the claimant was brutally beaten.
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Compensation was awarded on the theory that
the claimant thought he was protecting his
employer's property. The court stressed that
in an emergency the actor's judgment should
not be too severely judged, so long as he
acted in good faith.
Nor was his act of
grabbing the beer "aggression" under the
California statute, since obviously the
claimant was not intending the harm anyone.
Moreover, the fact that the episode took place
outside the claimant's working hours was
immaterial.
Larson's Workman's Compensation, Vol. 1, § 11.15(a), footnote 46.1.
Mr. Judd has attached a copy of this case as Addendum C to this
brief.
Mr. Judd

and Mr. Coyle were

staying

at the motel

designated by their employer, and parked their trucks in an area
they felt was the best spot available.

Later that night they

checked their vehicles and the cargo to insure their safety, and
upon inspection tried to fend off some young men attempting to
vandalize the cargo.

In their effort to protect their employer's

cargo, Mr. Judd was severely beaten.

In an emergency situation,

the conduct of the employee should not be looked at too harshly.
Martinez, 544 P.2d at 1350.

All of these facts are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. As shown in Point I, there is
absolutely no credible evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion
that

the

fight

arose

over

the

attention

of

two

women.

Consequently, Mr. Judd's injury arose out of and in the course of
his employment when he was severely beaten in trying to protect his
truck's cargo.
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3.

Because Mr. Judd's Injury Arose in a
Fiaht Over the Vehicles, Defendants7
Contention That the Industrial Commission
Erred When it Stated the Fiaht Was Closely
Entangled to the Work Even if it Were Over
the Affections of the Women is Moot.

The facts of this case show that Mr. Judd was
protecting the cargo of his truck, and there is no objective
evidence that the fight arose over the affections of the women. It
is moot to further discuss the Industrial Commission7s statement
that even if the fight were over the women, Mr. Judd would be
awarded benefits.

POINT III.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING MR. JUDD
A THIRTY DAY EXTENSION TO FILE
HIS MOTION FOR REVIEW
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants claim that the Industrial Commission abused
its discretion by granting a 30-day extension to Mr. Judd because
he did not show just cause.

Defendants rely on Utah Code Ann. §

63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii), which states:
The Appellate Court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
agency action [that] is contrary to the
agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and
25

rational
basis
(Emphasis added).
Id.

for

the

inconsistency;

Because this is an interpretation of the statute, this court

reviews

it under the

"correction-of-error

standard."

Morton

Intern, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991).
B.

EVEN IF THE ERROR OCCURRED, DEFENDANTS HAVE
FAILED TO SHOW HOW THEY WERE SUBSTANTIALLY
PREJUDICED

If an error has occurred, this court can only grant
relief if defendants have "been substantially prejudiced" by the
error.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4).

Also, defendants have the

burden of "showing not only that the error occurred, but that it
was substantial and prejudicial in that the Appellant was deprived
in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed
issues by the jury."
147, 154 (Utah 1987).

(Emphasis added). Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P. 2d
Furthermore, this court, in Adams v. Board

of Review of Indus. Comm., 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), stated:
[T]he substantial prejudice language in
Section 63-46b-16(4) prevents an appellate
court from granting relief if the agency error
is harmless.
The supreme court defined
harmless error as being an error "sufficiently
inconsequential that . . . there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings." (Citations
omitted and emphasis added).
Id. at 7.
Defendants are quick to cite to Utah R. Civ. P., 6(b) in
support of their claim that the request for extension was not
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timely filed.

However, defendants ignore Utah R. Civ. P., 61,

which states:
fN]o error or defect in any ruling or order or
in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is ground for granting a
new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment
or order, unless refusal to take such action
appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice.
The court, at every
stage of the proceeding, must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does
not effect the substantial rights of the
parties. (Emphasis added).
Id.
In the case at hand, defendants claim "this unwarranted
extension

prejudiced

Commercial

Carriers

because

the

Board

ultimately granted Mr. Judd's Motion for Review." Defendants brief
p. 19. Defendants do not even attempt to show that the Industrial
Commission substantially prejudiced their claim.

"Substantially

prejudiced" means that they were "deprived in some manner of a full
and fair consideration of the disputed issues" by the Industrial
Commission.

See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987).

The extension did not preclude them from presenting additional
testimony, adding to the record in any fashion, or filing any
additional motions.
Furthermore, defendants7 Appeal also violates Utah Code
Ann. § 35-1-33, which states:
A substantial compliance with the requirements
of this title shall be sufficient to give
effect to the orders of the Commission, and
they shall not be declared inoperative,
illegal or void for any omission of a
technical nature.
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Id.

Defendants want this court to believe that, because Mr. Judd

did not state "good cause" for his Motion for an Extension, he
should not receive his benefits.

Because defendants cannot show

that they were substantially prejudiced, this appears to be a
technicality

upon

which

they

are

trying

to

overturn

the

Commission's Order.
C.

DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ACTED INCONSISTENTLY

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) requires defendants
to show that the agency has acted contrary to its prior practice.
Defendants

cite

to

Maverick

Country

Stores

v.

Industrial

Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993), in support of this
position. However, the facts of Maverick differ from the facts in
the present case.
In Maverick, the Petitioner filed his Motion for Review
one day after the 30-day time limit had run.

Id. at 946.

After

the Industrial Commission denied the request for review, Maverick
requested the Industrial Commission to reconsider.

Id. The basis

for the Commission's denial was that Maverick had not shown good
cause for the extension.

Id.

In the case at hand, Mr. Judd filed a request for
extension one day prior to the cut-off.

This Motion was granted.

Because the facts of Maverick and this case are significantly
different, defendants have failed to show the Industrial Commission
acted inconsistently from prior practice.
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In Pease v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 694 P.2d 613
(Utah

1984) , Pease

sent the

Industrial

Commission

a

letter

requesting a "motion for review," but without specifying any
alleged errors in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or
Order.

Id. at 614.

Industrial

Pease also asked for an extension.

Commission

"treated

extension of time . . . ." Id.

the

letter

a

The

request

for

Because the letter had been filed

timely, the court granted the extension.
more

as

Id.

The facts of Pease are

in line with the facts of this case.

The Industrial

Commission, in the past, has granted extensions for letters timely
filed with the Commission.
Defendants

have

failed

to

show

that

they

were

substantially prejudiced by the Industrial Commission's granting of
a

3 0-day extension.

Furthermore, because defendants have a

meritless case, they are trying to take Mr. Judd's benefits away
from him because of a technicality. Such a tactic runs contrary to
the Workers7 Compensation statutes and the harmless error standard.
Also, defendants have failed to show that the Industrial Commission
acted contrary to prior practice in granting Mr. Judd a 30-day
extension.

Therefore, defendants7 appeal must be denied and Mr.

Judd awarded his benefits, including interest.

II

CONCLUSION

[I

Defendants contest the Industrial Commission's Findings
of Fact. Defendants state the Industrial Commission's finding that
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the fight arose while Mr. Judd was trying to protect his truck's
cargo is a factual finding.

Consequently, the defendants had a

duty to marshall all of the evidence supporting that finding.
Defendants failed miserably to do so.

They simply reargued facts

that support the ALJ's finding, which was erroneous.

There is

absolutely no objective evidence that the fight arose over the
affections of two women. In fact, there is substantial evidence to
the contrary, which defendants also failed to marshall.

Because

defendants failed to marshall the evidence, this court must affirm
the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact.
The Industrial Commission correctly applied the law to
the facts of this case in finding that Mr. Judd's injury arose out
of and in the course of his employment.
transport his cargo in a safe fashion.

Mr. Judd had a duty to

He was staying in a motel

approved by his employer. As he was getting ready to go to bed, he
checked his trucks and saw two young men attempting to vandalize
his truck's cargo.

Mr. Judd yelled at them and the two young men

ran about 3 0 yards into a field which was adjacent to the trucks.
Mr. Judd and Mr. Coyle walked into the field after them to insure
that they had left. The young men had not left and turned upon Mr.
Judd and Mr. Coyle and severely beat Mr. Judd.
violate

any company

instructed

policy because Mr. Judd had never been

what to do

vandalize his vehicle.

This did not

if he catches

somebody

attempting to

Mr. Judd's attempt to protect his truck's

cargo was within the course of his employment.

Consequently, his

injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.
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Defendants

have

failed

to

show

that

they

were

substantially prejudiced when the Industrial Commission granted Mr.
Judd

a

3 0-day

extension

to

file

his

Motion

for

Review,

Furthermore, defendants have failed to show that the Industrial
Commission acted inconsistently with prior conduct.

Therefore,

because defendants have failed to show substantial prejudice or
inconsistency by the Industrial Commission, the error is a harmless
error.

Therefore, defendants7 attempt to deny Mr. Judd his

rightful benefits are based upon a technicality and must be denied.
This court must affirm the Industrial Commission's Order.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of August, 1994.
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.

EUGlftJE C. MILLER/ JR.
/
Attorney for Applicant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify this 23rd day of August, 1994, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE RONNY L.
JUDD were hand delivered to the parties at the following address:

Anne Swensen
Julianne R. Blanch
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

1402\appeal\reply.823
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ADDENDUM A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

35-1-33- Orders not to be set aside on technicalities.
A substantial compliance with the requirements of this title shall be sufficient to give effect to the orders of the commission, and they shall not be
declared inoperative, illegal or void for any omission of a technical nature.

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the^
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was
not purposely seTf-inflicted', shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
#
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record: or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied:
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution:
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History-: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, junsdicrion
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610.

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error
or defect m any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement, When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending
before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for
cause shown be made on ex parte application. WTien a motion is supported by
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some
other time.
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the
prescribed period.

ADDENDUM B
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR REVIEW

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
CASE NO. 92- 1401
RONNIE LYN JUDD,

*
Applicant,

*
ORDER GRANTING

vs.

*
MOTION FOR REVIEW

COMMERCIAL CARRIERS AND OLD
REPUBLIC INSURANCE,
Defendants.

*
*
*

Ronny Lyn Judd seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's
Order denying him compensation under Utah's Workers Compensation
Act.1
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW
The issue before the Commission is whether Mr. Judd's injuries
arose out of and in the course of his employment, as required by
§35-1-45 of the Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission makes the following findings of fact:
1.
Mr. Judd h^s been employed as a truck driver by
Commercial Carriers since 1980, working out of the company's
Clearfield, Utah terminal.
2.
During mid-May, 1992, Mr. Judd and another driver, Mr.
Coyle, were assigned to drive two trucks loaded with new
automobiles from Missouri to California.
3.
Judd and Coyle left Missouri the morning of May 21.
Because they were limited by company policy and/or government
regulation to driving no more than 10 hours or 54 0 miles at a
stretch, they stopped at Ft. Kearney, Nebraska for the night.
4.
At approximately 6:30 p.m., Judd and Coyle located an
appropriate motel in Ft. Kearney, parked their trucks adjacent to

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1 et seq.
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each other in the parking lot, checked into their respective rooms,
then went to the motel's lounge.
5.
In the lounge, Judd and Coyle consumed alcoholic
beverages. Two women already in the bar, one of whom was a slight
acquaintance of Judd, joined them at their table. To some degree,
the women joined Judd and Coyle to avoid the attentions of two
other younger men, who had been asking the women to dance.
6.
When the lounge closed, Judd and Coyle walked the two
women to their car and said goodby. The women then drove away.
7.
At approximately the same time, the two young men who had
also been in the lounge struck up a conversation with Judd and
Coyle. The young men suggested they buy more beer and drink it in
their motel room. Judd and Coyle declined the offer, stating it
was too late and that they had to leave early the next morning.
8.
During the course of this conversation, the young men
expressed
interest in the new cars Coyle and Judd were
transporting. The young men suggested they would like to take one
of the cars for a drive. Judd told the young men that such use of
the cars was not permitted and that the cars all had alarms in
them.
9.
At this point, Judd and Coyle left the young men and
walked into the parking lot to check their trucks.
They then
walked across the parking lot to a convenience store to buy some
personal items, but the store was closed.
..' 10. As they walked back to the motel, Judd and Coyle observed
the two young men walk into a field adjacent to the parking lot,
then return to the parking lot and walk around the cars and trucks
that were parked there. Judd and Coyle went to their trucks and
observed the young men from the shadows.
11. The young men approached Judd and Coyle's trucks and
heard to say "these must -abe the vehicles with the alarms".
and Coyle then stepped out from the shadows and told them to
away from their trucks and all the other trucks in the parking

were
Judd
stay
lot.

12. The two young men ran away into the field.
Judd and
Coyle walked into the field after them. Approximately 3 0 yards
into the field, the young men stopped. One of them began beating
Judd, resulting in very serious injuries that give rise to Judd's
claim for compensation.
13. Hospital blood tests establish that Judd had a blood
alcohol level of .18% at the time the test was taken, after the
beating.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISCUSSION
As a preliminary note, the Commission has essentially accepted
the ALJ's determination of every point of disputed fact. Thus, as
far as the objective facts are concerned, there is no variance
between the Commission and the ALJ's findings.
However, the
Commission does not accept the inferences the ALJ has drawn from
those objective facts.
In particular, the Commission finds no
basis to conclude that Judd's beating was the outgrowth of a
dispute over the women at the bar.
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides
compensation to each employees "who is injured . . . by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment." In the case
of Mr. Judd, it is conceded that he was injured and that the injury
was by accident, as that term is used in the workers' compensation
law. The only issues that are disputed are whether his injury: 1)
arose out of his employment; and 2) arose in the course of his
employment. Those two issues are discussed in that order below.
I.

ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT

As noted by the ALJ's decision, in workers' compensation law
the term "arising out of employment" requires a causal connection
between the injury and the employment. Neither the parties nor the
ALJ have cited any Utah appellate decisions which specifically
apply the foregoing requirement to facts similar to this case.
However, Professor Larson discusses the subject:
The controlling test should be 'if the circumstances of
the employment can be fairly said to have elicited
conduct by the employee which results in his injury.'
(Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, §11.11(c),
p. 3-205.)
More specifically with respect
Professor Larson states:

to

fights

involving

employees,

If the fight is spontaneous and closely entangled with
the work itself, as most are, ths assertion that the
claimant left his employment is an outright fiction, and
fictions should not be invented to block benefits
conferred by remedial statutes.
(Larson's Workmen's
Compensation Law, Vol. 1, supra, §11.15(a), p. 243.)
It is difficult to imagine a situation where an employee's
work could be more entangled with an ensuing fight. Judd presence
in Kearney and at the very motel where the injury occurred was
just one stop on a continuing work assignment. The very nature of
his employment involved the transport and concomitant safe
AA'Ys9
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keeping of his truck and its cargo. The fight resulted from Judd
and Coyle's efforts to keep the other men away from the trucks.
The Commission notes the hypothesis that Judd's beating
resulted from a fight over women rather than a fight over the truck
and cars.
There is no objective evidence to support that
hypothesis and the Commission does not accept it. However, even if
the hypothesis were true, the beating was still "closely entangled
with the work itselfff. The Commission therefore finds that Judd's
injuries arose out of his employment.
II.

IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

As noted above, not only must an employee's injury "arise out"
of the employment to be compensable:
it must also be "in the
course of" the employment.
The term "in the course of employment" requires both that the
injury arise within the time and space boundaries of the employment
and in the course of an activity related to the employment.
(Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 1, supra, §14.00, page
4-1.)
As a truck driver on assignment, Judd's injuries clearly arose
within the time and space boundaries of his employment.
Even
though Judd had parked his truck some hours earlier and had spent
time in the motel lounge, any such personal deviation from his work
duties ended when
Judd and Coyle checked their trucks after
leaving the lounge, then returned to the trucks out of a suspicion
that the two younger men might have theft or vandalism in mind.
For the same
injuries arose in
employment.

reasons, the Commission finds that Judd's
the course of an activity related to his

The question of whether Judd and Coyle exercised good judgment
is not relevant to this discussion, as the negligence of an
employee is not a bar to workers' compensation benefits. As to
Judd's intoxication, the Commission recognizes that both Judd and
Coyle had been drinking on the night in question and that Judd had
a blood alcohol level high enough to render him unfit to operate a
motor vehicle. While §35-1-14 of the Act requires a 15% reduction
in compensation when injury is caused from the intoxication of the
employee, the facts before it do not allow the Commission to
conclude that Judd's intoxication caused his injuries.
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Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that Mr.
Judd's injury suffered during the early morning hours of May 22,
1992, in Kearney Nebraska, arose out of and in the course of his
employment by Commercial Carriers.
DECISION
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge in this matter is
reversed and the workers' compensation claim of Ronny Lyn Judd is
hereby reinstated.
This matter is remanded to the Adjudication
Division of the Industrial Commission of Utah for such further
action as is required on Mr. Judd's claim, consistent with this
decision. It is so ordered.

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this
Order.

RONNY LYN JUDD
ORDER
PAGE SIX

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVJEW in the case of RONNY LYN JUDD, Case
Number 92-1401, on Z/jiAday
of ^ i ^ - ^ y (
, 3.9*7 V to the
!
following:
RONNY LYN JUDD
4729 SOUTH 4140 WEST
KEARNS, UTAH 84118
BRYAN B. DAVIS
3587 WEST 4700 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84119

ANNE SWENSEN
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PALACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
P O BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
770 REAR EAST PITTSBURG STREET
GREENSBURG, PA 15601
TIMOTHY C. ALLEN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsels Office
Industrial Commission of Utah

oo:)ss

ADDENDUM C
MARTINEZ V. WORKMENS* COMP. APP. BD.
15 CAL.3d 982, 644 P.2d 1350 (1976)

127 CALIFORNIA REPORTER

150

15 Cal.3d 982

544 P.2d 1350

4. Workmen's Compensation <§=52, 610

15 Cal.3d 982

Workmen's Compensation Act must be
liberally construed in employee's favor and
all reasonable doubts as to whether an injury arose out of employment are to be resolved in favor of the employee.

| Stephen 0. MARTINEZ, Petitioner,
v.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS
BOARD and Roman Catholic Bishop
of San Diego et al., Respondents.
L. A. 30515.

Supreme Court of California.
Feb. 2, 1976.
As Modified March 1, 1976.
Volunteer church worker and member
of its parish council sought workmen's
compensation for injuries sustained in altercation while he was attempting to prevent loss of church property by theft during church fund-raising activity on church
premises.
The Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board denied compensation and
the claimant appealed.
The Supreme
Court, Richardson, J., held that the emergency effort by volunteer acting in good
faith to save church's property constituted
act performed within the course of employment entitling him to compensation.
Decision of Board annulled and cause
remanded.

1. Workmen's Compensation <§=>1939.4(4)

Factual determinations of Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board must be upheld if findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of entire record.
West's Ann.Labor Code, § 5952(d).
2. Workmen's Compensation <§=>627

Emergency effort by employee acting
in good faith to save his employer's property from loss by theft constitutes an act
performed within the course of employment
entitling claimant to workmen's compensation benefits even if rescue effort takes
place outside of working hours.
3. Workmen's Compensation <§=*I360

Employee bears burden of proving that
his injury was sustained in the course of
his employment.

5. Workmen's Compensation <S=627

An "emergency" for purpose of applying rule that work-related emergency activities are compensable may be deemed to exist whenever an employee faces an immediate and apparent on-the-premises theft of
his employer's property.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
6. Workmen's Compensation <§=627

Injury to claimant, a volunteer worker
for church and member of its parish council which organized and supervised church
fund-raising activity held on church premises, while attempting to prevent the theft
of church's property from its premises,
which parish council determined would be
policed by its members rather than hiring
security guard, rose by reason of act performed within the course of employment
for church employer and was compensable.
West's Ann.Labor Code, § 5952(d).
7. Workmen's Compensation <§=M593

Action of claimant member of church's
parish council, which had voted to police
church fund-raising activity on church
premises, in grabbing youth who possessed
what claimant felt was property of church
did not constitute an act of aggression
which would render him ineligible for compensation for injuries received in the ensuing altercation. West's Ann.Labor Code,
§§ 3600, 3600(g).
8. Workmen's Compensation <§=678

In view of the statutory policy of liberal construction in favor of injured workman, the provision denying compensation
in case claimant is the aggressor must be
narrowly and strictly construed, and the
initial physical aggressor is the one who
first engages in physical conduct which a
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reasonable man would perceive to be real,
present and apparent threat of bodily
harm. West's Ann.Labor Code, §§ 3600,
3600(g).
Thompson, Talbott & Lemaster and
George D. Thompson, Pomona, tor petitioner.
Chernow & Lieb and Donald C. Lieb,
Los Angeles, for respondents.
j _ R I C H A R D S O N , Justice.
Petitioner Stephen O. Martinez was
beaten and seriously injured while attempting to prevent the theft of his employer's
property. The sole question before us is
whether petitioner is entitled to recover
workers' compensation for the injuries he
incurred. We have concluded that emergency efforts by an employee acting in
good faith to save his employer's property
from loss by theft constitute acts performed within the course of employment,
and that accordingly petitioner should be
afforded compensation benefits.
Petitioner was a member of the parish
council of Our Lady of Guadalupe Roman
Catholic Church of Chino. The council was
composed of various church members appointed by the parish priest to organize
and supervise volunteer, service-type activities. A fiesta was planned by the council
for June 17, 1973, to raise funds to buy a
new air conditioning unit for the church.
The festivities were to be held on church
premises and were to include carnival-type
games and the sale of food and beer.
Among the topics discussed by the council
during its planning sessions was the subject of security; evidently some concern
existed regarding possible disturbances by
intoxicated persons and others who might
attempt to disrupt the fiesta. To avoid the
expense of hiring security guards, the
council voted to assume the task itself by
policing its own party.
Petitioner's specific duty was to assist in
^ e operation of the beer booth.
He
worked there from noon until 4:30 p. m.
when he left to have dinner with his wife
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and children. After his dinner, petitioner
strolled around the fiesta with his family.
Although there were enough volunteers to
operate the beer booth, petitioner nevertheless regularly checked the booth to see if
his help was needed. During his walks, he
received several reports that teenagers were
pilfering beer from the stock used to resupply the booth. Petitioner's initial efforts
to locate the offenders were{unsuccessful,
but at 8 p. m. he encountered a group of
juveniles on the church premises in possession of beer which petitioner believed
to be stolen. (Petitioner may have been
mistaken, as his employer's beer was chilled
and the beer in the juveniles' possession was
warm. However, the mere passage of time
might have accounted for the apparent difference in temperature.)
Petitioner asked one of the youths to return a six-pack of beer he was then holding. The youth responded with profanity,
and petitioner grabbed him and attempted
to retrieve the six-pack; a fight ensued
and petitioner was hit on the head with a
wine bottle and brutally beaten and kicked
by his assailants. As petitioner's employer
(the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego) had obtained a workers' compensation
insurance policy covering volunteer workers, petitioner filed a compensation claim.
(See Lab.Code, § 3363.6.)
Following a hearing, the workers' compensation judge (formerly referee) found
that petitioner was engaged in protecting
his employer's property when the incident
occurred and that this activity was so
closely related to petitioner's employment
duties as to justify compensability for petitioner's injuries. On petition for reconsideration, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board declined to adopt the judge's
recommendation, holding that petitioner's
injuries were not incurred within the
course of his employment. In particular,
the board found (1) that petitioner's beer
booth duties terminated at 4:30 p. m., and
(2) that petitioner had no duty to investigate theft, as he was not hired as a security
guard.
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[1] It is well established that the factual determinations of the board must he
upheld if its findings are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the entire
record.
(Lab.Code, § 5952, subd. ( d ) ;
LeVesque v. Workynens Comp. App. Bd., 1
Cal.3d 627, 637, 83 Cal.Rptr. 208, 463 P.2d
432.) In the present case, it is questionable whether the board's findings are founded upon substantial evidence. Certainly,
petitioner, as a volunteer worker, considered himself "on call" at the beer booth
whenever his services were needed, for he
regularly returned to the booth to ascertain
whether enough volunteer help existed.
Moreover, although he was not formally
hired as a security guard, he was a member of the church council which had voted
to "self-police" the affair. Thus, it is arguable that petitioner was engaged in both
"beer booth" and "security" activities at
the time he was injured.
J986 _L.[2] We need not rest our decision upon
such narrow grounds, however, for even if
petitioner had completed his employment
duties at the time of the incident in question, he should be permitted to recover
compensation under the present circumstances. As a recognized authority in the
compensation area has explained, "[i]t is
too obvious for discussion that emergency
efforts to save the employer's property
from fire, theft, . . . or other hazards
are within the course of employment. The
fact that the rescue effort takes place^ outside of working hoars does not detract
from its work-connected status"
(1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law (1972)
§ 28.11, pp. 5-269, 5-270, italics added and
fns. omitted; see also, 2 Hanna, Cal.Law
of Employee Injuries and Workmen's
Compensation (2d ed. 1975) § 9.01 [2], p.
9-7.) Years ago, in an analogous situation, we held compensable a stable hand's
injuries sustained during his attempt to
rescue a child endangered by a horse on
the employer's premises. (Ocean A. & G.
Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1919) 180
Cal. 389, 182 P. 35.) As we stated, "To be
sure, he was not employed to rescue chil-

15 Cal.3d 985

dren.
But certainly it was reasonably
within the course of his employment, within the scope of those things which might
reasonably be expected of him as an employee, that he should attempt to prevent
an accident on his employer's premises
. . If, in this case, Nelson, instead
of being injured in an attempt to prevent a
child being run over on his employer's
premises by an officer of his employer
there on his company's business, had been
injured in an attempt to put out an incipient fire accidently started in the barn, it is
hardly possible that any question would
have been made. Yet there is no real distinction between the two cases. Nelson
was no more employed to put out fires
than he was to rescue children. The point
is that the danger which threatened, and in
attempting to remove which he was hurt,
was one which threatened his employer
and directly concerned it, and with which
Nelson was confronted in the discharge of
his customary duties." (Pp. 392-393, 182
P. p. 36.)
Similarly, in the present case, although
petitioner may not have been employed to
prevent theft of his employer's property, it
was reasonably within the course of his employment that he might attempt to do so.
As stated in a recent case, "Whether a
particular activity be classified by the
term's [sic] response to an emergency, rescue, personal comfort or convenience, recreation, exercise, courtesy, or common decency, the point is that the activity was
reasonably to be contemplated because of
its general nature as a normal human response in a particular situation or in some
cases because of its being recognized as an
acceptable practice in the particular place
by custom. Human services cannot be employed |without taking the whole package."
(North American Rockwell Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 9 Cal.App.
3d 154, 159, 87 Cal.Rptr. 774, 777 [injury
sustained in employer-furnished parking
area while assisting fellow employee].)
[3,4] Similarly, in Johnson v. Chicago
& N. W. Ry. Co. (1942) 69 S.D. I l l , 7 N.

|m
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W.2d 145, the court held compensable an
injury sustained by a railroad employee
who was injured when he attempted to
stop his assailants from stealing his employer's coal. Despite the fact that the
workman was hired to shovel coal rather
than act as a watchman or guard, the court
held that an employee does not leave the
course of his employment when he acts to
protect his employer's property from theft.
The Johnson rationale should apply with
equal force to injuries recieved on the employment premises by an off-duty employee
while attempting to prevent such a theft.
As we recently observed in Garza v.
Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.
3d 312, 90 Cal.Rptr. 355, 475 P.2d 451;
"Although the employee bears the burden
of proving that his injury was sustained in
the course of his employment', the established legislative policy is that the Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally
construed in the employee's favor (Lab.
Code, § 3202), and all reasonable doubts as
to whether an injury arose out of employment are to be resolved in favor of the
employee. [Citations.] This rule is binding upon the board and this court" (P.
317, 90 Cal.Rptr. p. 358, 475 P.2d p. 454.)
[5,6] Courts have not been precise in
defining the types of situations which constitute an "emergency" for purposes of
applying the rule that work-related emergency activities are compensable.
(See
Larson, supra, § 28.13, pp. 1-276, 5-277.)
We believe, however, that an "emergency"
may be deemed to exist whenever an employee faces an immediate, and apparent,
on-the-premises theft of his employer's
property. Moreover, according to Larson,
"[i]t is a well-established principle, even at
common law, that the actor's judgment
about the existence of an emergency and
how to meet it should not be too severely
judged in retrospect. He may get the benefit of the emergency doctrine even if the
only emergency was in his imagination, if
he acted in good faith!'
{Id., p. 5-277,
fns. omitted, italics added.) It appears uncontradicted that petitioner acted in a good
127 Cal.Rptr.—IOV2
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faith attempt to prevent an on-going theft
of his employer's property.
[7] Respondents suggest that petitioner
herein acted as an "aggressor" in initiating
the "altercation" which resulted in his injuries and that,(accordingly, he should be
denied compensation on that ground. (See
Lab.Code, § 3600, subd. (g) [compensation
denied when applicant is the "initial physical aggressor" in an "altercation"].) We
do not believe, however, that petitioner's
act in grabbing the youth who possessed the
six-pack of beer in question constituted an
act of aggression within the meaning of
section 3600.
[8] We recently had occasion to review
the principles underlying the aggressor
provision in Mathews v. Workmen's Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1972), 6 CaUd 719, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 301, 493 P.2d 1165. Initially, we noted that in view of the statutory policy of
liberal construction in favor of injured
workers, the aggressor provision itself"must be narrowly and strictly construed.
[Citation.]" (P. 726, 100 Cal.Rptr. p. 305,
493 P.2d p. 1169.) We next explained that
" . . . an 'initial physical aggressor' is
one who first engages in physical conduct
which a reasonable man would perceive to
be a * "real, present and apparent threat of
bodily harm. . . . ' " [Citation.]" (P.
727, 100 Cal.Rptr. p. 305, 493 P.2d p. 1169,
fn. omitted.) In the instant case, it is
doubtful that petitioner's act of grabbing
the youth for purposes of wresting from
him the six-pack of beer presented a "real,
present and apparent threat of bodily
harm." Rather, it should have been apparent to a reasonable man that petitioner intended no harm under the circumstances
but acted only to retrieve property which
he believed to have been stolen.
Moreover, we also suggested in Mathews
that the aggressor provision was intended
as a deterrent to, or punishment for, acts
of "wilful wrongdoing" or "intentional
misconduct." {Id., at pp. 728, 734-735, 100
Cal.Rptr. 301, 493 P.2d 1165.) Petitioner's
good faith attempt to prevent a theft of his
employer's property should not reasonably

127 CALIFORNIA REPORTER

154

be construed as misconduct disqualifying
him from compensation benefits. Indeed,
if the rule were otherwise, an employee
would forfeit his compensation rights
whenever he initiated physical means of
preventing misconduct by others and an altercation developed causing him injury.
Finally, the record indicates that the
board did not find that petitioner was an
aggressor, nor did the board purport to
deny petitioner compensation benefits on
that basis. The board's sole theory was
the petitioner was not acting in the course
of his employment when he was injured, a
theory which was incorrect as a matter of
law, by reason of the emergency doctrine
discussed above.
I The decision of the board is annulled
and the cause is remanded to the board for
further proceedings consistent with the
views herein expressed.
W R I G H T , C. J., and McCOMB, T O BRINER,
MOSK,
SULLIVAN and
CLARK, JJ., concur.
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I KEY MUMBER SYSTEM>

544 P.2d 1354
16 Cal.3d 14
j _ B R E T HARTE INN, INC., Plaintiff

and Respondent,
v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,
Defendant and Appellant
S. F. 23263.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Feb. 3, 1976.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing
March 10, 1976.
The City and County of San Francisco
appealed from a judgment of the Superior
Court, San Francisco County, Bernard B.
Glickfeld, J., granting recovery of certain
personal property taxes paid under protest.
The Supreme Court, Sullivan, J., held, inter alia, that a valuation method pursuant
to which full cash value of personal prop-
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erty was arrived at by discounting original
acquisition cost by a uniform "depreciation
factor" of 50% for all properties, regardless of age or condition, was arbitrary, in
excess of the assessor's discretion, and in
violation of constitutional and legislative
requirements that all properties subject to
taxation be assessed at its full cash value.
Affirmed.

1. Judgment <S>707
Action by taxpayer to recover allegedly improperly imposed personal property
taxes was not barred by prior proceeding
in which superior court issued writ of
mandate directing City and County of San
Francisco to undertake appropriate steps to
recover taxes lost due to misconduct of
former assessor where taxpayer involved
in major suit was not party to prior proceeding and interest of all parties to that
proceeding were adverse to those of taxpayer.
2. Taxation <S=543(I)
If plaintiff in personal property tax
refund suit claims only that assessor and
board of equalization erroneously applied
valid method of determining full cash value, decision of board is equivalent to determination of trial court and trial court in
turn may review only record presented to
board; trial court may overturn board's
decision only when no substantial evidence
supports it, in which case actions of board
are deemed so arbitrary as to constitute
deprivation of property without due process.
3. Taxation <S=543(8)
When taxpayer, seeking refund of personal property taxes, challenges validity of
valuation method itself, trial judge is faced
with question of law as whether challenged
method of valuation is arbitrary, in excess
of discretion or in violation of standards
prescribed by law.
4. Taxation <^347
Xo property may escape taxation because of difficulty in determining its full
cash value. West's Ann.Const. art. 13, § 1.

